




Israel Gottlieb Canz’s Uberzeugender Beweiß aus der 
Vernunft von der Unsterblichkeit sowohl der Menschen 
Seelen insgemein, als besonders der Kinder-Seelen (Be-
weiß) was first published in 1741 and is reprinted here in 
its second, expanded edition (a third, and further expan-
ded edition would follow in 1746).1 At the time of its 
initial publication, Canz was already well known, particu-
larly for his extended argument for the compatibility of the 
Wolffian philosophy with theology in Philosophiae Leib-
nitianae et Wolffianae usus in theologia (Usus) of 1728.2 
Beweiß is a continuation of the project launched in that 
text, as Canz undertakes the application of the Wolffian 
method to the revealed truth of the immortality of the 
soul. 
Beweiß stands as Canz’s most influential discussion of 
the soul’s immortality with one critic pronouncing this 
text in particular to be “one of the best [treatments of 
immortality] that we have.”3 Even so, Beweiß is not his 
only nor even his most detailed publication on the topic. 
                                                 
1 For details regarding Canz’s life and publications, see “Canz, 
Israel Gottlieb (1690–1753)” in Heiner F. Klemme and Man-
fred Kuehn (eds.), The Bloomsbury Dictionary of Eighteenth 
Century German Philosophers, 2nd edn. (London 2015), pp. 
123–6. 
2 Israel Gottlieb Canz, Philosophiae Leibnitianae et Wolffianae 
usus in theologia per praecipua fidei capita (Christian Wolff, 
Gesammelte Werke, eds. J. École, et al., III. Abt., Bd. 110.1–2, 
Hildesheim 2009). 
3 Georg Friedrich Meier, Gedancken von dem Zustande der 
Seele nach dem Tode (Halle 1746), p. 17. 
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Indeed, Canz discusses immortality in Usus, where he 
presents two complementary proofs, with the first pro-
ceeding from the soul’s nature and the second on the 
basis of God’s justice. In the former, Canz argues that the 
soul’s simplicity is required by consciousness, and that 
the continued activity of the soul after the body’s death 
follows from the fact that its later states are causally gen-
erated by its earlier ones (Usus §461). In the latter argu-
ment, Canz contends that the soul’s immortality, particu-
larly its retention of its higher cognitive faculties follows 
from God’s justice inasmuch as reward or punishment 
presupposes consciousness and memory (Usus §466). 
This relatively brief treatment in Usus was followed 
up with the publication of a much more detailed four-part 
dissertation in 1740, the Dissertatio de immortalitate 
animae.4 The first and second parts take a historical ap-
proach, with the first discussing the doubts concerning 
immortality raised by ancient and modern authors, the 
second presenting a historical survey of opinions on im-
mortality. The third and fourth parts adopt a more sys-
tematic approach, with the third presenting a series of 
arguments for immortality that are grounded in a consid-
eration of the soul’s internal nature, and the fourth offer-
ing arguments that have their ground in a principle exter-
nal to the soul, namely in God. As Canz explains in the 
                                                 
4 The full title is: Dissertationis de immortalitate animae, Pars 
1. Eristica, dubia veterum et recentiorum quorundam dis-
cutiens (Tübingen, 1740); Pars II. Historica, nonnullorum 
veterum et recentiorum sententias expendens (Tübingen, 
1740); Pars III. Dogmatica prior, animae immortalitatem pro-
bans ex principio interno (Tübingen, 1740); Pars IV. Dogmati-
ca posterior, animae immortalitatem probans ex principio 
externo (Tübingen, 1740). 
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introductory section of Beweiß (cf. pp. 1–2), he was en-
couraged by readers of his dissertation to publish a treat-
ment of the topic in German so that his thoughts on this 
important matter might reach a wider audience, though he 
initially hesitated in following this advice. 
While Canz was not among Wolff’s students, and 
would develop a rather more speculative and eclectic 
Wolffianism,5 his discussion of immortality throughout 
these treatments falls squarely within the Leibnizian-
Wolffian tradition. Canz regularly draws upon Leibniz’s 
Essais de théodicée, particularly Leibniz’s criticism of 
the alleged Cartesian proof, but he also makes reference 
to Leibniz’s views on space and time as laid out in the 
correspondence with Clarke. Regarding Wolff, Canz 
takes Wolff’s initial treatment in the Deutsche Meta-
physik as his point of departure,6 though Canz’s attention 
to the division of the concept of immortality likewise 
indicates a debt to Ludwig Philipp Thümmig (1697–
1728) and specifically to his ground-breaking dissertation 
Immortalitas animae ex intima ipsius natura demonstrata 
of 1721 (which likewise influenced Wolff’s own presen-
tation).7 
                                                 
5 See “Canz, Israel Gottlieb (1690–1753),” p. 125. 
6 Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des 
Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt (Deutsche Metaphy-
sik), (Christian Wolff Gesammelte Werke, eds. J. École, et al., 
I. Abt., Bd. 2.1, Hildesheim, 2003), §§738–42, 921–27). 
7 The dissertation is included in Thümmig’s Meletemata varii 
et rarioris argumenti (Leipzig 1727), pp. 150–82. For discus-
sion of Thümmig’s importance in influencing Wolff’s own 
discussion of the soul’s immortality, see Corey W. Dyck, Kant 
and Rational Psychology (Oxford, 2014), pp. 44–5, 149. Canz 
refers to Thümmig’s dissertation in Usus §459. 
8* PREFACE 
 
A more immediate debt is owed to the treatments of 
two other important Wolffians, namely Georg Bernhard 
Bilfinger (1693–1750) and Johann Gustav Reinbeck 
(1683–1741). Bilfinger had been Canz’s colleague in 
Tübingen from 1721 to 1725, and Canz frequently refers 
to his discussion of immortality in the Dilucidationes 
philosophicae of 1725.8 Reinbeck’s treatise was pub-
lished the same year as Canz’s dissertation,9 and Canz 
credits Reinbeck’s book with ultimately convincing him 
to complete his own German treatise on the topic, in part 
because Reinbeck had not treated the soul’s immortality 
in accordance with a rigorous analysis of that concept’s 
Theilbegriffe (Beweiß pp. 3–4). It was also due to Rein-
beck that Canz was led to devote a section to the peculiar 
problems posed for a demonstration of immortality by the 
soul’s of children (cf. Beweiß p. 2 and §172). 
Beweiß consists of four main sections, though the 
principal arguments for the immortality of the human 
soul are presented in the first two, with the third and 
fourth turning to the immortality of the souls of children, 
and a more precise if highly speculative determination of 
the soul’s state in the afterlife. The division of labour 
between the first two main sections corresponds to that 
between Canz’s third and fourth parts of the dissertation 
on immortality, respectively, with the former tackling the 
grounds internal to the soul’s nature for immortality and 
                                                 
8 Cf. Dilucidationes philosophicae de Deo, anima humana, 
mundo et generalibus rerum affectionibus, (Christian Wolff, 
Gesammelte Werke, eds. J. École, et al., III Abt., Bd. 18, Hil-
desheim 1982), §§357–369. 
9 Philosophische Gedanken über die vernünfftige Seele und 
derselben Unsterblichkeit (Christian Wolff Gesammelte Werke, 
eds. J. École, et al., III. Abt., Bd. 79, Hildesheim, 2002). 
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the latter the grounds for immortality in God and so ex-
ternal to the soul’s nature. 
Before turning to the proofs, Canz begins by laying 
out the components of the concept of immortality (Be-
weiß §§1–6). Following Wolff and Thümmig,10 Canz 
distinguishes three necessary and jointly sufficient ele-
ments of immortality: incorruptibility, or that the soul 
does not naturally pass away as the body does; spirituali-
ty, or the soul’s preservation of its higher capacities such 
as reflection and reasoning; and personality (in the 
Wolffian sense), or the soul’s preservation of its capacity 
to recognize that it is the same being in the afterlife as it 
was previously. Canz takes up the proof of each of these 
theses in turn in the subdivisions of the first main section. 
Canz’s proof for the soul’s incorruptibility proceeds, 
again along the lines of Wolff’s,11 by arguing for the soul’s 
distinction from matter (and composites in general), which 
is taken to entail that the soul is simple and further, since 
nothing simple can pass away through the dissolution of 
its parts, that the soul is incorruptible (Beweiß §44). Tak-
ing the latter two steps as uncontroversial, Canz focuses 
on offering a variety of independent arguments for the 
soul’s distinction from matter, all of which try to demon-
strate the inexplicability of the soul’s higher cognitive 
activities on a materialist account. Among the novel ar-
guments offered for this claim, Canz contends that a ma-
terial composite is incapable of forming representations 
of universal concepts and truths, where this is required 
for the use of reason (Beweiß §§15–19); that such a com-
posite cannot possess the unity and identity of the subject 
                                                 
10 See Deutsche Metaphysik §925 and Immortalitas animae 
§14, respectively. 
11 Deutsche Metaphysik §§738–42. 
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required for reflection and willing (§§27–28); and that 
the capacity to maintain a thought over time requires a 
subject that remains unchanged over time (§34).12 Since 
such capacities cannot be realised in a material composite 
nor, presumably, in anything of a composite nature, Canz 
concludes that the human soul is not subject to dissolu-
tion and so is incorruptible. 
However, the incorruptibility, or natural immortality, 
of the soul does not of itself imply that it remains a spirit, 
that is, that it retains the use of its higher cognitive and 
conative functions in the afterlife. It remains possible that 
an incorruptible soul would revert to its previous state 
(that before birth), or even fall asleep after the death of 
the body (whether intermittently or eternally), and so that 
it would exist in a state where it is subject to none but 
obscure and unconscious representations (Beweiß §68). 
To dispel the former possibility, Canz contends in a 
teleological vein that just as our state before birth is 
merely a means to attain to the present and improved 
state, so the present is merely a means for attaining the 
future state which is likewise an improvement over the 
previous (Beweiß §§69–75). 
By way of ruling out the eternal sleep of the soul, 
Canz argues that since the soul will retain its powers, and 
so remain within the “order [Rang]” of rational spirits as 
long as it exists (Beweiß §52), it follows that its “princi-
pal internal end” must consist in continuing to demon-
                                                 
12 For discussion of the senses of identity at issue here, consult 
Udo Thiel, The Early Modern Subject (Oxford, 2011), p. 317. 
Canz’s other proofs borrow from Wolff (compare Beweiß §24 
and Deutsche Metaphysik §738), Bilfinger (compare Beweiß 
§§36–39 and Dilucidationes §271), and Leibniz (see Beweiß 
§40). 
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strate that it belongs within this class of spirits, which 
requires the exercise of its rational faculties in the after-
life (Beweiß §§80–1). In response to the challenge that 
the soul’s use of these faculties presupposes the body as 
the source of its cognitions, and so that without the body 
the soul would lack representations for thought, Canz 
invokes the Leibnizian-Wolffian characterization of the 
body as the limit of the soul’s representative power so 
that the loss of the body merely amounts to the removal 
of this limitation (Beweiß §89). Nor is it possible that the 
soul should intermittently sleep and wake in the afterlife 
since this condition is likewise only due to the exhaustion 
of the body (Beweiß §§390–1). 
Canz turns, finally, to the demonstration of the soul’s 
personality. Such a demonstration is required since the 
soul’s reward and punishment in the afterlife depends 
upon its retention of the capacity to recognize that it is 
the same soul as that which performed certain actions in 
its previous existence (Beweiß §4), and in order to rule 
out extravagant hypotheses such as the metempsychosis 
defended by the Pythagoreans (Beweiß §94), but it is also 
important for distinguishing what immortality consists in 
for the human soul from what it consists in for the souls 
of brutes. 
Canz’s proof is rather distinctive in that it proceeds on 
the basis of a “reflective,” or logical connection between 
our representations in the afterlife and those in the pre-
sent existence (Beweiß §96).13 Such a connection is ef-
fected, according to Canz, insofar as the soul reasons to 
claims concerning its previous state through the use of 
universal truths, but also insofar as reflection on these 
                                                 
13 Canz refers to this as a ‘logical’ connection in Dissertationis, 
Pars. III, §47. 
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truths prompts the recollection of individual experiences 
that provide examples of them (Beweiß §§97–8). This 
serves to distinguish the immortality of the human soul 
from that of the animal soul since, while the latter might 
likewise be admitted to be simple and so incorruptible, it 
remains incapable of such reflection or a grasp of univer-
sal truths (Beweiß §§100–3). 
In the second main section, on the grounds in God for 
the soul’s immortality, Canz turns to demonstrating that 
God has decided in favour of preserving the soul along 
with its higher capacities after the body’s death. Against 
the possibility that God might simply annihilate the soul 
upon the death of the body, its natural immortality not-
withstanding, Canz provides a number of proofs drawn 
from philosophical and natural theological considera-
tions. 
Among the former, he argues that the annihilation of 
the soul would be inconsistent with the nature of the 
world conceived as in space and time. So, he notes that 
created substances exist in connection in space insofar as 
the sufficient reason for the state of one substance lies in 
that of others; thus, were God to annihilate some among 
these simple substances the result would be a world in 
which there is a gap or rift (“Riß”) and, as a result, the 
world would not constitute a whole (“All”) of created 
substances (Beweiß §122). Similarly with respect to time, 
the connection of created substances in time would like-
wise be broken were a soul to be annihilated since the 
previous state of the world would contain the sufficient 
reason for a change in the successive state but such a 
change would not come about with the annihilation of a 
substance (Beweiß §125). 
Regarding grounds drawn from natural theology, 
Canz argues that the annihilation of the soul conflicts 
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with God’s wisdom and goodness. It conflicts, namely, 
with His wisdom to destroy a being which He created as 
incorruptible, and it is more consistent with His goodness 
to give eternal life than to take it away (Beweiß §§128, 
130). Canz argues that we can know that, in addition to 
not annihilating the soul, God would preserve its spiritu-
ality as well as its personality in the life to come. The 
principal case for the former rests upon the contention 
that preserving the soul’s spirituality would amount to a 
gift that the soul has not made itself unfit to receive, and 
so one which God’s magnanimity implies that He would 
give (Beweiß §§133–35). 
Canz offers a variety of further parallel proofs for this 
claim, but also considers a number of objections, includ-
ing that we do not know whether it is possible to grasp 
something by means of the pure intellect alone, and that 
our representation of universal truths relies upon sensible 
symbols and so would be impossible without the body 
(Beweiß §150). However, against the former objection he 
again points out that consciousness itself does not depend 
upon the body but the body instead only serves to limit it 
to sensible things (Beweiß §151), and against the latter he 
distinguishes between the symbol, which is arbitrary and 
sensible, and its signification, which is fixed and refers to 
a non-sensible concept (Beweiß §152). 
Lastly, regarding God’s choice to preserve the soul’s 
personality, or consciousness that it is the same being 
now as that which acted previously, Canz argues that 
were God not to preserve this capacity, then we could not 
honour God’s wisdom, goodness, or justice, where such 
is God’s ultimate end in creating rational souls (Beweiß 
§161). Souls without consciousness of their previous 
state would not honour God’s wisdom since, without a 
memory of their past, such a soul could not regard the 
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future state as the end or aim, arranged by God, of their 
previous existence (Beweiß §166). Neither could such 
souls come to honour God’s goodness, since they would 
be senseless of the source of all the goods in their previ-
ous life (Beweiß §168), nor could they honour God’s 
justice as they would not recall the previous actions that 
are the grounds of the rewards or punishments they re-
ceive in the afterlife (Beweiß §169). This is not to say 
that God would not be supremely wise, good, or just, but 
only that a soul without personality thus understood 
could not reasonably be expected to recognize Him as 
such. 
The remaining two main sections concern the immor-
tality of the souls of children and a more precise determi-
nation of the soul’s condition in the afterlife. Canz’s dis-
cussion of the souls of children sets out from Reinbeck’s 
treatment,14 and tackles the problem of accounting for 
how such souls could be said to have distinct representa-
tions, thoughts of universal truths, and the capacity for 
inferences in the afterlife despite lacking the opportunity 
to develop these capacities in their former life (Beweiß 
§173). Canz argues that such souls are of course human 
souls, and so with a disposition to develop such capaci-
ties, and moreover that not only does God set them “on 
the path to eternity” by bringing them into the present life 
(Beweiß §183), but also that these souls do have an op-
portunity to develop their capacities, such as differentia-
tion, in this life (Beweiß §184) and will not lack for op-
portunity to develop these further in the afterlife (Beweiß 
§§190–1). Notably, similar issues would be taken up later 
by Moses Mendelssohn (in connection with the loss of 
his eleven-month old daughter Sara) in an exchange with 
                                                 
14 See Philosophische Gedanken §§134–8. 
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Thomas Abbt relating to Johann Joachim Spalding’s Die 
Bestimmung des Menschen (Greifswald 1748).15 
The final main section turns to speculations concern-
ing the human soul’s condition in the afterlife, including 
the improvements in its cognitive and conative capacities 
(Beweiß §§205–12, §§213–19), the character of the soul’s 
new, spiritual body and consequent change in our sensa-
tions and desires (Beweiß §§228–39), and the improve-
ments in our reason insofar as it is liberated from its cor-
ruption (Beweiß §§240–2). Ultimately, Canz holds that 
“as the child of a very young age stands to a man of adult 
years, so one of adult years stands to the qualities of a 
citizen of the next world” (Beweiß §202). 
Despite its modest aims and careful avoidance of po-
lemic, Beweiß provoked a bitter reply on the part of one 
vehemently anti-Wolffian critic, in the Erste Probe be-
scheidener Anmerckungen which was published anony-
mously.16 Among the uncharitable characterizations of 
Canz’s arguments, petty quibbles over words, and base-
less insinuations of Spinozism and atheism17 are a smat-
                                                 
15 See Abbt’s “Zweifel über die Bestimmung des Menschen” 
and Mendelssohn’s “Orakel, die Bestimmung des Menschen 
betreffend,” in Moses Mendelssohn Gesammelte Schriften. 
Jubiläumsausgabe, eds. A. Altmann, et al. (Berlin 1929–; 
Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt 1971–); Bd. 5.1, pp. 619–37 
16 The full title of the work is: Erste Probe bescheidener An-
merckungen über Tit. Herrn Ißrael Gottlieb Canz, hochbe-
rühmten Professors in Tübingen sogenannten Ueberzeugenden 
Beweiß aus der Vernunft von der Unsterblichkeit der Seelen 
(Göttingen, Hager: 1741), with a second volume (Zweiter und 
letzte Probe [...]) following in 1742. 
17 The treatise itself consists of the titular Anmerckungen which 
is prefaced by a scurrilous preface allegedly inserted by some-
one else identified only as “Diogenes im Faß,” and followed by 
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tering of relevant objections, including an objection to his 
demonstration that matter cannot represent universal 
truths (Probe §8), a challenge to the assumption that the 
use of reason requires universal concepts (Probe §11), 
and a charge that Canz is too hasty in identifying immate-
riality with simplicity since he has not ruled out the pos-
sibility of material simples (Probe §28). Canz replied to a 
number of these objections, which replies account for 
many of the footnotes added to the second edition of 
Beweiß.18 
Canz’s Beweiß received a far more philosophically 
sophisticated treatment at the hands of Georg Friedrich 
Meier (1718–77), a fellow Wolffian (broadly construed), 
in the Gedancken von dem Zustande der Seele nach dem 
Tode (1746). It is likely that Meier’s general challenge 
regarding any insight into God’s decisions (Gedancken 
§35), his criticism of attempts to prove immortality on 
the basis of external grounds in God (Gedancken §§87–
90), and even his charge that some speak of the state of 
the soul in the afterlife “as if they had already been dead 
once” (Gedancken §1) target Canz specifically. 
                                                 
a remark by the author of the Anmerckungen and a final satiri-
cal response by “Diogenes.” The book was negatively re-
viewed, with the preface in particular drawing criticism in 
Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen, 1741 (96), p. 
834. Shortly after, Johann Matthias Gesner (1691–1761), a 
renowned philologist at Göttingen and former student of Johan 
Franz Budde, seems to acknowledge having written the An-
merckungen but denies authoring the preface or seeing it before 
it was bound with the Anmerckungen; see Göttingische 
Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen, 1742 (18), p. 144. 
18 Canz’s responses to the above-mentioned objections can be 
found in the footnotes to Beweiß §§16, 19, and 28.  
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In addition, Meier devotes the sixth and final division 
of his book to the detailed evaluation of Canz’s argu-
ments. Among other criticisms, Meier contends that the 
soul’s simplicity is irrelevant to immortality and accord-
ingly objects to Canz’s uncharitable presentation of the 
materialist position as upholding the death of the soul 
(Gedancken pp. 188–90, ad Canz §§10–14); argues for 
the possibility of a step-wise diminishment of conscious-
ness to its disappearance within the order of rational souls 
(Gedancken pp. 195–6, ad Canz §61); and denies that it 
is possible that finite beings could ever know with cer-
tainty that the annihilation of some finite souls, or even a 
rift in space and time, could not somehow contribute to 
the overall perfection of the world (Gedancken pp. 211–
13, ad Canz §§121–2). 
In the end, however, Canz seems ready to admit that 
certain aspects of his proof might be less than fully con-
vincing. In a passage near the conclusion of his treatment, 
he compares the learned world to a “form of government 
where the people rule” rather than a monarchy, which 
allows for topics to be openly debated and for everyone 
to be left to form their own judgment. Yet, he is also 
optimistic that even criticisms of accepted truths, such as 
the soul’s immortality, can yield a sought-for occasion 
for further, productive reflection on the rational basis for 
our confidence in them (Beweiß §200). 
 
Corey W. Dyck 
